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Human cognition is extended and enacted. Drawing the boundaries of cognition to include the resources 
and attributes of the body and materiality allows an examination of how these components interact with 
the brain as a system, especially over cultural and evolutionary spans of time. Literacy and numeracy 
provide examples of multigenerational, incremental change in both psychological functioning and 
material forms. Though we think materiality, its central role in human cognition is often unappreciated, 
for reasons that include conceptual distribution over multiple material forms, the unconscious 
transparency of cognitive activity in general, and the different temporalities of metaplastic change in 
neurons and cultural forms. 
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We think materially: Human cognition is extended, a system including not only brain but body 
and materiality as components, and enacted, with interactivity among brain, body, and world 
creating meaning and experience (Clark, 1997; Malafouris, 2013). This rather abstract definition 
can be at least partially illuminated by the philosophical adage on the sound-making potential of 
falling trees. Absent someone with appropriate proximity and normally functioning ears and 
brain, of course, there is only a disturbance of the air, but given a listener, sound occurs. What 
this implies is that without the brain, there’s no perception; what often follows is the idea that 
perception—and by extension, all cognition—means activity in the brain. But just as there’s no 
perception without the brain, there’s also no sound without the tree, whatever caused it to fall, 
the molecules of air, the waves of energy perturbing them, etc. They are as necessary to 
perception as the neural activity, though of course the ways in which they contribute to the 
cognitive system differ. 
 When materiality and behaviors are considered, it is often in the context of what they do 
to offload or supplement what the brain does. Human memory, for example, is relatively finite in 
its capacity, perishable in its duration, and difficult to make public, limitations that can motivate 
the use of material devices as “cognitive artifacts” (Hutchins, 1999). A classic illustration is that 
of Inga and Otto, fictive individuals with different forms of memory: Inga memorizes and 
subsequently recalls an address, which Otto writes in a notebook for later consultation (Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2008). Such artifacts have a long history: Notched bones from the Abri 
Cellier rockshelter dated to about 28,000 years ago may have once a comprised a tally 
(Marshack, 1991). While artifacts like Otto’s notebook can mitigate organic limitations in 
accumulating, storing, and sharing information, such devices are often regarded as external, 
ancillary repositories for mental content, a depiction that renders them more passive than they 
actually are and obscures attributes like their agency in shaping our behavior. Material properties 
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constrain our potential for interactive behaviors (simply, what materiality is influences what we 
can do with it) and necessitate behavioral investment (as things degrade through use we must 
actively restore or lose them) (Hodder, 2012; Malafouris, 2013). Otto’s notebook holds just what 
can be written on its pages, persists only while it isn’t damaged, lost, tampered with, and he 
retains the ability to read; he must also remember to consult it, periodically recopy content onto 
replacement pages, buy new pens, etc. 
 Another classic example is the cane used by a blind man (since Otto and Inga have names, 
let’s call him Roy). The cane extends Roy’s sense of touch to its tip, enabling him to navigate by 
becoming an integral part of both his perception and his body (Bateson, 1972; Malafouris, 2008; 
Merleau-Ponty, 2012). In these characteristics, Roy’s cane may seem more clearly an instance of 
extended and enactive cognition compared to Inga’s recollection or Otto’s notebook, in that it 
involves overt, unambiguous, and ongoing psychological–behavioral–material interactivity (in 
contrast, Inga’s recollection does not overtly or unambiguously involve materiality, Otto’s 
infrequent consultation of his notes does not comprise ongoing interactivity, etc.). Arguably, 
however, incorporating notebook and cane as integral components of memory and perception 
makes both examples of extended cognition; similarly, using notebook and cane to create meaning 
and experience makes them enactive. Indeed, without materiality, the behaviors that engage it, and 
the psychological capabilities and behavioral options it enables, the world would be quite different 
for Inga, Otto, and Roy. Their use of materiality enacts their world. 
 The idea that materially is integral to human cognition must be placed into historical 
context because identifying even the brain with cognition is a relatively recent and not 
uncontroversial development. Franz Joseph Gall, for example, is now remembered more for 
phrenology, the pseudoscience wherein bumps on the skull were held to govern aspects of 
personality and cognitive dispositions, than his notion the brain had something to do with mental 
functions (Gall, 1835). Admittedly, Gall did not much develop the latter aspect of his work because 
at the time the idea that brain and mind were related was not just revolutionary but heretical. What 
he did write about the brain’s involvement in mental functions certainly got him into trouble: 
Between 1802 and 1817, his writings were suppressed by the Church and got him fired and driven 
from cities and countries (Tovino, 2007), and he was even reportedly excommunicated over them 
(Moscati, 1832). The established, permitted view of the time equated mind with an immaterial soul 
whose existence was both religiously enforced and philosophically attested (e.g., as Descartes 
famously divided mind from brain as ontologically distinct substances). 
 If an idea that was thoroughly rejected a mere two centuries ago is now widely accepted, 
there nonetheless remains a Cartesian divide between mind and materiality that can and should 
be challenged (Malafouris, 2013). Why take this perspective? Going back to the question about 
sound, the falling tree can also (wrongly) imply that perception is mere (passive) presence. To 
the contrary, perception not only involves world and body as well as brain (i.e., extension), 
making sense of the world is “inherently active” (enaction): Bodies and behaviors engage the 
world “in transformational and not merely informational interactions” (di Paolo, Rohde, & de 
Jaegher, 2010, p. 39). Transformational interactions occur at multiple levels: neuronal responses 
to environmental stimuli, physiological characteristics that influence stimuli salience, behaviors 
that change what stimuli are available, etc. Such interactivity determines experience and 
meaning; that is, doing and thinking are the same phenomenon, even if it may not seem to us that 
they are. Further, of all known species, ours is uncommonly adapted to incorporate materiality 
into our transformational activities. That is, we don’t just hear trees fall, chop them down, or 
make tools of twigs, things that beavers and chimps can do; we also use wood to build 
instruments and create music, using materiality to accumulate social knowledge and influence 
communal behaviors, interface what a society knows and an individual learns (Haas, 1996), and 
distribute cognitive effort over space and time (Hutchins, 1995). 
 Even more importantly, our interactions with materiality have the potential to change our 
psychological functioning. Listening to music affects mood, for example, and practicing an 
instrument is associated with functional and structural changes in the brain (Gaser & Schlaug, 
2003; Nayak, Wheeler, Shiflett, & Agostinelli, 2000). Over longer (cultural and evolutionary) 
spans of time, changes in psychological processing enable new behaviors with materiality, which 
can be manipulated thereby into novel forms that can stimulate further change in brains (e.g., 
literacy and numeracy, as will be discussed). However, since archaic brains cannot be subject to 
the kinds of experimental protocols available with living brains, investigating how cognition 
changes over cultural and evolutionary spans of time necessitates new methods in which 
diachronic change in the material record is examined for what it might indicate about change in 
associated behaviors and psychological processes, interpreted using criteria based on neurological 
function and form as understood by cognitive psychology and neuroscience (Wynn, 2002). 
 This method is not reverse engineering, which argues backward from a psychological 
ability to its possible evolutionary function, as change in culture and technology can be faster 
and subject to more complex pressures than just natural selection (Coolidge & Wynn, 2009). Nor 
does it necessarily assume a ratchet effect, in which cultural developments accumulate in a way 
that may preclude retrograde change (Basalla, 1988; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratnet, 1993), since 
cognitive change can be both non-random and non-directional. Further, behaviors and brains 
change too, dimensions often missed when technology is the focus. In viewing cognition as 
extended and enacted, positions adopted by Material Engagement Theory, the emphasis is on 
how behaviors with materiality can yield change in psychological processing, opening up 
possibilities (not necessarily realized) for further change in behaviors and materiality—in other 
words, how tools make minds (Malafouris, 2013). 
 
Literacy 
Writing is thought to have been independently invented perhaps four times, in Mesopotamia, 
Egypt, China, and Mesoamerica. Mesopotamia is typically credited with being first, around 3200 
BC. Given their geographic and temporal proximity, Egypt (ca. 3100 BC) and China (ca. 1200 
BC) might represent cultural diffusion, rather than invention. Mesoamerica, of course, is far 
enough away in space and time (ca. 600 BC) to be considered independent. While writing may 
have been invented, literacy wasn’t, nor could it have been since there was no idea of it to act as 
goal. Rather, literacy developed through incremental change in brains, behaviors, and materiality 
accumulated over multiple generations under conditions of sustained social support for the 
material engagement that is writing. In investigating how this occurred, it is important to point 
out that the material record of Mesopotamia has the detail and extent needed to correlate material 
change with change in behaviors like handwriting and the psychological processing involved in 
reading and writing, and that the behavioral and psychological dimensions of literacy are 
understood well enough to provide reliable criteria. Arguably, as literacy does not exist without 
its material form or the behaviors that engage it, it is unambiguously extended and enactive, 
making its material change particularly likely to represent change in its behavioral and 
psychological components. Also, since literacy occurred fairly recently in terms of human 
cognitive evolution, there are minimal issues in comparing archaic brains to living ones: 
Certainly, we are talking about the same species, with similar behaviors under similar conditions, 
giving the insights of cognitive psychology and neuroscience specific relevance to understanding 
diachronic material change. 
 Given the right conditions of training and practice, people today can become literate in a 
few years (Pegado, Nakamura, & Hannagan, 2014), a matter of enculturation into an existing 
system of literacy that changes behavior and psychological processing. But when writing was 
first invented some five thousand years ago, not only were brains not literate in the way ours can 
become, writing was also incapable of expressing language with any fidelity. In fact, the earliest 
writing was so inexpressive that scholars still aren’t sure whether the associated language was 
Sumerian or Akkadian (while most lean toward Sumerian, credible arguments have been offered 
in support of both possibilities; see Englund, 1998; Veldhuis, 2014). Acquiring literacy and 
developing fidelity highlight the idea that both brains and writing must undergo change for 
literacy to emerge. This is why many centuries intervene between the earliest writing and its use 
beyond use as commodity labels in accounting, and even more centuries pass before writing 
becomes extensible to multiple discursive applications. 
 The earliest writing and reading involved this-means-that associations between material 
signs (simple pictures and figures) and semantic meanings or phonetic sounds (Figure 1). But 
when used to represent words, pictures and figures are somewhat ambiguous: For example, a 
picture of a head can mean head, person, or capital. Some way of specifying which word is 
meant is needed (this is one of the key differences between representing words and representing 
quantity: three of something may be ambiguous regarding the something but not its quantity; 
Overmann, 2016a). Though not literate in our sense, such writing and reading nonetheless 
represented dynamic interactivity between brains, bodies, and materiality: As hands moved to 
mark signs on clay, eyes watched the productive movements and read the resultant signs, 
fostering greater coordination between hands and eyes and teaching brains to recognize and 
recall signs and associated lexical meanings. Over the next several centuries, this psychological–
behavioral–material interactivity reorganized brains, enabling changes in behaviors and 
materiality to emerge, with the result that writing became increasingly able to express language 




Figure 1. (Left) Quartered disk used to signify “ungulate” (e.g., sheep, cattle) in proto-cuneiform. (Right) 
The word “ungulate” in alphabetic script. Understanding either involves reading, but the literacy involved 
in reading the word at right differs from the “this-means-that” association involved in understanding the 
sign at left. Sign adapted from the Cuneiform Digital Library Initiative. 
 
 Contemporary neuroscience knows a lot about the neural activity that differentiates a 
brain that is literate from one that is not (Dehaene et al., 2010; Dehaene, Cohen, Morais, & 
Kolinsky, 2015; Nakamura et al., 2012; Perfetti, 2003; Perfetti & Tan, 2013). Part of the 
fusiform gyrus in the temporal lobe, which evolved to recognize faces and objects, becomes 
trained to recognize written characters as if they were objects—through combinations of their 
local and global features (Cohen & Dehaene, 2004; Vogel, Petersen, & Schlaggar, 2014). Once 
trained, this part of the fusiform gyrus is known as the Visual Word Form Area, and its ability to 
become trained in reading is cited as an example of neuronal recycling, in which an existing 
brain function has sufficient plasticity to respond to and become co-opted for a cultural invention 
(Dehaene & Cohen, 2007, 2011). A literate brain is also characterized by coordination between 
the Visual Word Form Area and the parts of the brain that control handwriting and produce and 
comprehend speech (respectively, Exner’s Area in the middle frontal gyrus; Broca’s Area, 
inferior frontal gyrus; and Wernicke’s Area, superior temporal gyrus) (Pegado et al., 2014). 
 Handwriting (as opposed to other forms of manipulating materiality to represent 
information, like shaping clay into three-dimensional figures or carving signs into stone) was 
critical to developing literacy. Across languages, the word writing originated in verbs like 
scratch, incise, and paint (Senner, 1989). Today handwriting is understood to improve fine 
motor skills, hand-eye coordination, recall of written material, recognition of signs, and tolerance 
for character ambiguity (i.e., sloppy handwriting) (James & Engelhardt, 2012; Longcamp, 
Zerbato-Poudou, & Velay, 2005; Mueller & Oppenheimer, 2014; Sülzenbrück, Hegele, 
Rinkenauer, & Heuer, 2011). It forms associations between visual signs and the meanings and 
sounds of language through the coordination between the Visual Word Form Area and 
Exner’s/Broca’s/Wernicke’s Areas. Most importantly for the development of literacy, 
handwriting represented a continual tinkering with, and adjustment of, the materiality stimulating 
the psychological processes engaged in writing and reading (Overmann, 2016a). Social 
conditions in the late fourth millennium were perfect for this continual tinkering: Mesopotamia 
was a state-level bureaucracy with massive administrative requirements (Englund, 1991, 2001; 
Nissen, Damerow, & Englund, 1993). Scribes wrote and read, hours per day and days for years, 
the same simple characters with this-means-that associations, interactivity that began to 
reorganize their brains. 
 As handwriting behavior continued, fusiform gyri started to become trained in 
recognizing signs by their features and coordinating with brain regions controlling handwriting 
and speech. By 3100 BC, sign production became more efficient as wedge-shaped impressions 
made by stylus displaced the drawing of curved lines (Cooper, 1996; Nissen et al., 1993), and 
over the next several centuries, wedge order became standardized, enhancing lexical retrieval 
(Bramanti, 2015; Giovanni, 1994; Taylor, 2015). As signs became recognized by their local and 
global features, there was less need for them to retain their original iconic forms, so they became 
increasingly less depictive and were ultimately simplified (Nissen et al., 1993; Studevent-
Hickman, 2007). Scribes also started modifying signs for words with clues to the intended 
meanings and sounds (e.g., determinatives, word order, syllables, etc.), and by the beginning of 
the third millennium, these were sufficient to identify the language as Sumerian (Cooper, 1996). 
As signs became more specific, their recruitment of Broca’s and Wernicke’s Areas for semantic, 
syntactic, and phonological functions would have intensified. Additional incremental change can 
be discerned across seven dimensions: lexicography, organization, syntax, orthography, 
applications, curriculum, and language expressiveness (Overmann, 2016a). 
 By the start of the Old Babylonian period (ca. 2000 BC), Mesopotamian writers stopped 
splitting words between lines of text (Cooper, 2004), suggesting that the recognition of complex 
signs may have been enhanced by contiguity. They developed a cursive script (i.e., script 
characterized by “abbreviated signs, crowded writing, and unclear sign boundaries”; Veldhuis, 
2011, p. 72), demonstrating that object-recognition processing now tolerated a high degree of 
ambiguity in character form. They extended writing to all sorts of new discursive applications 
(Veldhuis, 2014), demonstrating an ability to grapple with the ideas writing expressed, rather 
than the mechanics of its production. Finally, they implemented a formalized curriculum for 
training scribes (Krispijn, 2012; Veldhuis, 2014), signifying that writing had become opaque 
without trained object-recognition processing. The amount and rate of change across the seven 
dimensions also decrease around this same time. These developments suggest that psychological 
processing, behavior, and the material form of writing had changed through their interactivity 
sufficiently that Mesopotamian literacy had finally begun to resemble our own, about fifteen 
hundred years after the first simple pictures and figures were written by hand. 
 This is not to say Old Babylonian literacy was the same as ours; in the millennia that 
followed, literacy continued to change, to become widespread, multimedia, digital, high speed, 
and emoji enhanced. But forget for the moment that literacy subjects language and ideas to 
analysis, communicates them across space and time (Donald, 1991; Olson, 1994, 2013), and 
challenges matters of textual authority and authorial presence (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; 
Derrida, 1974). Instead, consider only its material dimension. The materiality of writing and its 
behavioral engagement are integral to literate reading and writing. It engages specific behavioral 
abilities and psychological capacities: handwriting; hand-eye coordination; object-recognition 
processing; interregional brain coordination. Through generations of tinkering and adjustment, 
the material form becomes increasingly capable of eliciting particular behavioral and 
psychological responses. Today the material component of literacy embodies and makes 
available the changes incrementally accumulated by past brains, bodies, and materiality; acts as a 
medium for recreating those changes in present individuals; and, through mechanisms like 
malleability and contrasts of form and structure, affords possibilities for realizing future change. 
 
Numeracy 
Another example of long-term change resulting from interactivity between brains, bodies, and 
materiality is numeracy, the cognitive system for numbers. Like literacy, numeracy is a process 
of multigenerational, incremental change in both the materiality used to represent and manipulate 
numbers and the psychological processes they engage. Numeracy illuminates important 
additional aspects of the function of materiality in human cognition, as will be discussed. In 
general, the material forms used for representing numbers inform how they are conceptualized. 
Materiality influences structural characteristics (e.g., linearity) of the cognitive system for 
numbers, while incorporating new material forms facilitates numerical elaboration. Materially 
influenced structural characteristics persist across changes in material form, distributing concepts 
over multiple forms, making concepts seemingly independent of any particular form and 
enabling them to act as an abstract conceptual domain. 
 Numbers are concepts of quantity shared by sets of objects (Russell, 1910, 1920). As the 
perceptual experience of quantity (cardinality) is insufficient for realizing number concepts 
(Rips, Bloomfield, & Asmuth, 2008), sets of objects must be manipulated into a form where their 
shared quantity can be appreciated, familiar as behaviors like pairing and one-to-one 
correspondence (Overmann, 2015, 2016b). This material engagement bootstraps the process of 
forming concepts of shared quantity because “it is simpler logically to find out whether two 
collections have the same number of terms than it is to define what that number is” (Russell, 
1920, p. 15). Concepts of shared quantity are then represented by one of the sets in the formative 
comparison, typically the fingers, which is why so many languages have words like digit that 
mean both finger and number and form the numbers six through nine as five-plus-x, and why so 
many number systems are based on 10 (decimal), 5 (quinary), or 20 (vigesimal) (Comrie, 1989; 
Greenberg, 1978; Menninger, 1992). Use of the fingers to represent numbers imposes linearity 
and stable order (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978), for reasons that include reducing the demand on 
working memory, facilitating the accessibility of the represented information (an effect word 
order has in speech), and enhancing lexical recall through conventionalized motor movements 
(an effect mentioned previously for handwriting in literacy). 
 Between the late Upper Paleolithic and the Bronze Age (roughly 24,000 to 4000 years 
ago), peoples in the Ancient Near East counted with fingers, tallies, tokens, and numerical 
notations. Finger-counting is attested by characteristic groupings (10, 5, and 20) and compounds 
(five-plus-x) in lexical numbers in several of the region’s archaic languages (Blažek, 1999; 
Diakonoff, 1983; Edzard, 1980). Notched bones from the Epipaleolithic Levant may have been 
used as tallies (Coinman, 1996; Reese, 2002). Small clay tokens were used for accounting in 
Neolithic Mesopotamia (Amiet, 1972; Damerow, 2007; Schmandt-Besserat, 1992), and numerical 
notations associated with the development of a complex mathematics by the Bronze Age were 
written on clay tablets (Chrisomalis, 2010; Høyrup, 2002; Nissen et al., 1993; Postgate, 2013; 
Robson, 2008). As the materiality changed, the concept of number would have changed too, from 
equivalences between fingers and objects (finger-counting), to collections whose quantities were 
related to objects (tallies and one-to-one correspondence) and each other (tokens and bundling, in 
which ten or six tokens of a lower value were equal to one unit of a higher value), and finally to 
entities related numerically to other entities (numerical notations and tables), similar but certainly 
not identical to our concept of number. (Collections and entities can be differentiated as ‘two and 
two are four’ and ‘two plus two is four,’ respectively; see Gowers, 2008.) 
 Interaction with the material forms for numbers would have changed psychological 
processing as well. For example, material linearity influences linearity in the so-called mental 
number line, an internal resource for estimating numerical magnitude (Brannon, 2006; Fischer, 
2008; Previtali, Rinaldi, & Girelli, 2011), and its linearity facilitates the conceptualization of 
higher quantities in regularized and productive ways (Butterworth, Reeve, Reynolds, & Lloyd, 
2008; Dehaene, Izard, Spelke, & Pica, 2008; Frank, Everett, Fedorenko, & Gibson, 2008; 
Gordon, 2004; Núñez, Cooperrider, & Wassmann, 2012; Piazza, Pica, Izard, Spelke, & Dehaene, 
2013; Pica, Lemer, Izard, & Dehaene, 2004; Siegler & Booth, 2004). Arithmetic and 
mathematical tasks recruit executive functions like attention and working memory (Bull & Lee, 
2014; Bull & Scerif, 2001; Van der Ven, Kroesbergen, Boom, & Leseman, 2012). These in turn 
increase goal-directed behavior, allowing new behaviors to emerge, like rearranging tokens into 
new combinations or performing calculations that are more complex. New material 
combinations, of course, can stimulate further change in psychological processing and behaviors. 
 Materiality influenced structural characteristics of the cognitive system for numbers as 
well. Fingers (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978) and tallies imposed linearity and stable order that 
persisted in how the loose tokens were organized. Because they were loose, tokens injected 
manipulability that enabled the realization of relations between numbers and algorithms for 
manipulating them (i.e., combining or separating tokens and bundling or debundling them, similar 
to the way an abacus works). With notations, which are fixed, manipulability persisted in the form 
of new algorithms used to manipulate the relations between numerical representations, something 
that intensified the need to remember and recall the relations (Overmann, 2016c). Numerical 
notations also allowed for greater concision in representing numbers, facilitating the development 
of tables (e.g., tables of multiplicative and reciprocal relations), and garnering the handwriting 
effects previously discussed for literacy. These would ultimately enable numbers to become 
conceptualized as entities (rather than collections of objects) related to one another numerically. 
 The incorporation of new material forms would have enabled the elaboration of number 
concepts. As new material forms are incorporated into a number system, the highest number 
counted increases (Divale, 1999; Overmann, 2013a, 2013b). The increase in the availability of 
exemplars (i.e., more numbers in the number system) tends to increase the likelihood that the 
relations between numbers will be discovered and explicated (Beller & Bender, 2011; Bender & 
Beller, 2011). Similarly, the increase in exemplars tends to make it more likely that operations on 
the relations between numbers (e.g., addition, multiplication, complex algorithms, etc.) will be 
discovered and explicated. Contrasts between older and newer material forms would also have 
made it more likely that numerical concepts would become elaborated (Overmann, 2016c), as 
they would have provided opportunities for the brain to do something it does extremely well—
recognize patterns and form categories and abstractions (Clark, 2008; Devlin, 2003). 
 As structure persists across changes in material form, concepts become distributed over 
multiple forms. For example, a number like ‘37’ is distributed across signs for ‘three’ and 
‘seven’ (i.e., 3 × 101 plus 7 × 100), similar to the way it was once distributed across cuneiform 
notations ( ), collections of tokens, tally notches, and fingers (the latter assumes the use of the 
hands of multiple individuals, suggested by groupings of 10 and 20 in compound number terms 
in archaic languages; see Blažek, 1999; Wilcke, 2005). Distribution is also implicit in the 
persistence of older forms, not only in the structure and capabilities they provide, but perhaps in 
their actual use as well. That is, people enculturated into the Western mathematical tradition still 
count with their fingers, make tally marks (卌), and use coins (which bear functional similarities 
to Mesopotamian tokens), along with writing numerical notations on paper and poking them into 
computers and calculators, and the associated concept of number encompasses all these various 
ways of representing them, as well as the things to which they’re applied—like time, distance, 
speed, cost, and temperature. In being anchored and stabilized (Hutchins, 2005), structured, and 
distributed by all these forms of materiality, numbers become independent of any one particular 
form, an attribute that helps them function as a cognitive technology, structuring how the world 
is experienced and engaged. 
 Distribution helps obscure (or make transparent) the role of materiality in the cognitive 
system for numbers. Interestingly, the material role may be more apparent in an unfamiliar 
number system. For example, Neolithic token-based accounting has been characterized as 
mechanical, or concrete in the term once promoted by Piaget; in contrast, Bronze Age numerical 
notations and calculation methods have been considered abstract, likely because they more 
closely resemble the familiar Western notations and methods (Damerow, 1996, 2010; Schmandt-
Besserat, 1992; for a critique, see Chrisomalis, 2005). The concrete–abstract distinction, 
however, tends to inflate the material aspect of tokens and the symbolic nature of notations, 
while minimizing tokens’ semiotic complexity and notations’ materiality (Overmann, 2016b, 
2016c), when in actuality Mesopotamian tokens and notations share both material and semiotic 
qualities. But Bronze Age calculations and methods can also seem concrete when compared to 
contemporary mathematics: Babylonian mathematicians didn’t multiply length times width to 
calculate an area, but used something called a projection that evokes the ropes and rods used to 
measure fields (Høyrup, 2002). Half the projection was moved to form a larger square, used to 
calculate total area (Høyrup, 2002) in a method with a palpable sense of manipulating a material 
model. Understanding how this technique worked isn’t as important as recognizing that while it 
perhaps seems materially dependent and thus rather concrete, it was likely as intuitive and 
abstract to Babylonian mathematicians as area = length × width is to us today, suggesting that 
materiality is most transparent when we use it (e.g., notations written on paper, algorithms to 
manipulate them) and becomes increasingly opaque as its familiarity decreases. 
 
Metaplastic Change in Co-existing Temporalities 
Literacy and numeracy represent collective remodeling of brain functions through behavioral 
interactions with material forms, a generative process that allows emergent change in behaviors, 
material structures, and brain functions and form. The ability of neurons and cultural forms to 
change through their interaction is metaplasticity (Malafouris, 2010, 2015). The term 
characterizes both the mechanism of change—interactivity—and the capacity for change in 
brains, behaviors, and materiality, dimensions that are inseparably entwined in the ongoing 
creative evolution that is human becoming. When multigenerational processes of collective 
metaplastic change are described, they sound a lot like genetic change. Certainly, it is reasonable 
to believe there are genetic underpinnings to literacy and numeracy—things like our capacity for 
language and appreciating quantity, our ability to extend them across multiple sensory 
modalities, and our propensity for incorporating materiality as an integral part of our cognitive 
system. However, literacy and numeracy are not genetic but cultural, and critically depend on 
social conditions for sustaining and recreating the requisite behaviors and material forms. 
 Metaplastic change involves differing but co-existing temporalities—neural reactions 
measured in fractions of seconds and ontogenetic developments that unfold over decades; centuries 
to millennia and longer for materiality. In the moment—reading these words, for example—it may 
be difficult to appreciate that the dynamic interactivity of psychological processes, behaviors, and 
material forms constitutes participation in multigenerational change. Certainly, the material form 
(printed page, computer display) seems unchanging, and its material agency is often unnoticed. 
The brain’s activity in processing written language is mostly unconscious, as cognition is in 
general: We don’t deliberately perceive objects or form memories or think through the moment-to-
moment details of how we will perceive, learn, move, or speak (Kihlstrom, 1987, 1989). And our 
experience of cognition is, on the whole, individual rather than collective. And yet, literacy was 
realized through just such in-the-moment interactivity—between individuals and material forms; 
within communities of practitioners—over millennia. In contrast, page and screen have previous 
lives as pulp and minerals, and temporalities that span human processes of collection, use, and 
destruction. Over cultural and evolutionary spans of time, material forms change rapidly, reflecting 
our technological capabilities for manufacturing, our social capacities for things like trade, our 
aesthetic sensibilities and creativity, the change in brain function and form. The temporal span is 
such that our collective cognitive change is generally imperceptible to individual experience, 
especially change in its psychological dimension. 
 The different temporalities coexist and connect in the individual, who not only 
reproduces and transmits his or her enculturated knowledge and skills to social others, but also 
provides a unique variability to the mix—the potential of a different psychological capacity, a 
different physical characteristic, a different behavioral ability, a different material combination 
or context. Individual variability admits the potential for innovation that may be reproduced by 
others. Participation and change occur when these words are read; our cumulative variability is 
the overall trajectory of change. Our activity is the fabric of human becoming. The different 
temporalities also connect and coexist in the material. Andy Clark once attributed the swimming 
efficiency of fish to an evolved capacity for dynamically exploiting the kinetic energy of water 
(Clark, 1997). Our analogy, Clark said, is language, but it is also material. Materiality bridges the 
different temporalities, in seeming to change least when we change most, and in changing most 
rapidly when we cannot see ourselves changing at all. 
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